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Book Review of Sex & Social Justice, 









Sex & Social Justice. By Martha C. Nussbaum. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999. Pp. 486. $35.00. 
 
This volume from Martha Nussbaum collects 15 essays written 
during the period 1990-97, 14 of them previously published but 
rewritten for this book, and one new piece. Followers of Nussbaum's 
recent work will find the matter of the opening essays familiar, as they 
reprise themes about sex equality and the welfare of women that she 
has taken up within the "human capabilities" ethical framework on 
display in two previous volumes Nussbaum co-edited with Amartya 
Sen (The Quality of Life, 1993) and with Jonathan Glover (Women, 
Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, 1995), 
both studies prepared for the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (WIDER) of the United Nations University. In the 
acknowledgments in the present volume, Nussbaum credits to her 
experience with WIDER between 1986 and 1993 "a new sense of 
empirical reality and of the historical and political complexity" of issues 
of justice (viii). 
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Some readers might yet be surprised by some features of this 
project: John Stuart Mill looms larger here than Aristotle, and the neo-
Kantian flavor is strong. The framing concepts here are liberal staples 
of dignity, equal worth, and liberty. The book takes up its topic, not 
simply in the spirit of liberalism, but in the spirit of a liberal rationalism 
whose message is not only that rationally gifted beings are and must 
be self-disposing over a wide extent of their private and public lives 
(Mille an non-interference) but also that a life itself should be 
"organized by critical reasoning" (Stoicism via Kant) (10). Moreover, in 
the battle for human dignity, Nussbaum holds, "if we fight with any 
weapon other than rational argument, we will have given our 
adversaries the greatest victory that they could possibly win, that of 
debasing our humanity" (331). The author also describes the approach 
as feminist in a way that is internationalist, humanist, liberal, 
concerned with the social shaping of preference and desire, and with 
sympathetic understanding (6-14). While fineness of perception of 
particular human beings and richness of response to their minutely 
perceived situations is a signature theme for Nussbaum, the last 
concern here takes a back seat to a set of analytical exercises and 
strongly framed arguments for liberty and dignity unsullied by 
irrational prejudice related to matters of "sex." 
 
The subject "sex" comprehends a broad territory here, 
including: biological sex and the norms of gcnder it attracts in every 
culture; sexuality; sexual behavior and sexual desire; sexual 
objectification; paid sex work; same-sex relations now and in the 
ancient Greek world. In an essay that provides an admirably clear 
introduction to the idea of the "social construction" of feelings, she 
views the "sexual domain" of human life as one of "symbolic cultural 
interpretation, shaped by historical and institutional forces, though 
within constraints imposed by biology," so that "cultural formations 
affect not just the theoretical explanation of desire but the very 
experience of desire, and of oneself as a desiring agent" (56). This, 
Nussbaum says, does not foreclose rational debate or lead to 
relativism; instead, it "opens up a space for normative argument, 
political criticism, and reasoned change" (56). Topically, the essays 
address the situations of women generally and of lesbians and gay 
men because "human dignity is frequently violated on grounds of sex 
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or sexuality" (5). The essays repeatedly put the question: What kinds 
of moral, legal, and political treatment respect the dignity of human 
beings when sex is, in any of these ways, at issue? The answers are 
for the most part as you might expect in a liberal feminist view-
generally, complete legal and social equality for women and those not 
heterosexual, strong objections to religious restrictions on women's 
legal and civic status and to traditional practices of non-trivial genital 
cutting. But there are valuable additions, such as an effective 
discussion of how problematic categories for "sexual orientation" really 
are, and some surprises, such as a mitigated (and somewhat class-
bound) defense of prostitution. 
 
For those used to the literary and dramatic prose of some of 
Nussbaum's other work, this volume will read on the whole as a tract 
and locally as a series of briefs. This seems to be the author's purpose, 
and it is a strength of the book. This work is devoted to the "urgent" 
need for "moral stand taking" (31). At its best, it is instructive and 
seems clearly intended to instruct as it persuades. It instructs by 
"making cases" in a stepwise, conceptually crafted, and sequentially 
argued way, often buttressed by empirical research. For this reason 
the tone is largely didactic or forensic. While those steeped in 
literatures of feminism or gay and lesbian studies will find some of 
these discussions (or some parts of them) at the level of a primer, 
they might enjoy seeing familiar points rehearsed without obtrusive 
and excluding jargon and seeing the liberal cases put in aggressively 
linear form. These essays could make good instruction pieces for 
students as well, teaching the virtues of clear statement and argument 
while defending worthy and humane points about social inclusion and 
fairness. 
 
At the same time, this didactic form has the vices of its virtues. 
At 373 text pages, the lesson goes on for a long time, and the 
instructor is often peremptory in defining the subject. Nussbaum does 
not hesitate to tell "feminism" what to be and do, while it would be 
more gracious and critically productive to engage in more breadth and 
depth with a varied and sophisticated literature now several decades 
along (notes for chapter 2 include references amounting to a very brief 
syllabus). This more sustained conversation might move Nussbaum to 
reconsider her claim that "wherever you most mistrust habit, there 
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you have the most need for reason" (79). Mature feminist criticism has 
repeatedly shown that reason is most needed where one trusts habit, 
including habits of using philosophical vocabularies like that of 
liberalism. Contrary to her account of it, liberal theory was not 
produced by ignoring (l0) or failing to notice (64) that women were not 
comprehended in theory, or by failing to follow their thought to its 
conclusion (65). It carefully constructed a view of political life in which 
women had a quite determinate, indeed ineliminable, structural role 
that involved their socially normed sUbsumption by men. More 
untrusting critical scrutiny is required to assess how thoroughly we are 
freed from this subsumptive and exclusive universalism of 
Enlightenment thought, with its logic of qualification (usually in terms 
of "rationality") for equality and its entitlements. For Nussbaum's 
purposes, the use of this vocabulary needs to be thought through in 
relation to the capabilities approach. 
 
Nussbaum reiterates her foundational view that an "account of 
the central human capacities and functions, and of the basic human 
needs and rights, can be given in a fully universal manner, at least at 
a high level of generality, and ... this universal account is what should 
guide feminist thought and planning" (8). But two issues remain elided 
here. Even the strongest argument for a universally recognized set of 
capabilities that are characteristically human will not support robustly 
nornlative claims that these capabilities should or must be supported 
equally or in the same ways or in the same people to the same degree 
and to the same ends. Even as she acknowledges that the position on 
capabilities is "evaluative from the start," Nussbaum minimizes the 
nature of the gap between those already on board the "specifically 
political consensus" (40) which she advocates and those who are not. 
It is often the very agreement that some kinds of human functioning 
(sexuality, emotion, practical thought) are truly fundamental and 
central that has made disagreement about their proper role in human 
lives, or their proper distribution in human communities, so charged 
and often so intractable. It seems that Nussbaum herself is implicitly 
conceding this as she annexes appeals to dignity and rights that do not 
arise out of but provide one kind of normative engine for driving an 
ethics whose content is capabilities. 
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This big book is swelled by several pieces it did not need. An 
essay on "Equity and Mercy" is an interesting reflection on justice but 
makes little contact with the topic of the book; a review of Andrea 
Dworkin is repetitive following a searching general essay on sexual 
objectification, and one of Richard Posner adds little to the book's 
arguments; an encomium to Sir Kenneth Dover, to whom the book is 
dedicated, is out of place; and a concluding piece on Virginia Woolf 
and our knowledge of other people is lovely but related only in the 
most oblique way to the matters under discussion. Some of these 70 
pages might have been devoted to trim and forceful closing arguments 
in keeping with both the overall style and the aim. Readers will find 
more than enough here to test their logical wits, moral sympathies, 
and political convictions where "sex" is at issue. 
 
